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ABSTRACT 
Research into the process and performance of technological innovation 
has led to two generations of recipes for innovation success, the first 
focusing on organization structures for the combination of marketing 
and R&D, the second on corporate culture and its manifestations. This 
paper draws on recent research on new product development as a 
political process to show the connections between the two sets of 
recipes, to demonstrate their practical limitations, and to indicate how 
these might be overcome. 
1 
Recites for successful innovation 
The problem of how to foster and manage 
technological innovation has long been of 
primary concern to both academics and 
executives. Since the late 1960s a large 
and still growing body of research 
evidence has pointed consistently to the 
conclusion that, for relatively small 
innovations at least, there is a broad 
correlation between the success of new 
product innovations and the extent to 
which their development is marketing or 
user led (Marquis, 1969; Mansfield and 
others, 1971; Utterback, 1971; Litvak and 
Maule, 1972; Rothwell, 1974; Cooper, 1975; 
Mansfield and Wagner, 1975; von Hippel, 
1976, 1978, 1982; Freeman, 1982; Quinn, 
1985; Georghiou and others, 1986; Cooper 
and Kleinschmnidt, 1987). This is not to 
say that technology push has no part to 
play in successful innovation. On the 
contrary, it has been widely recognized 
that a purely market-led approach can be 
every bit as limiting as a purely 
technology-driven one (Dessauer, 1971; 
Tauber, 1975, 1979; Imae and others, 1984; 
Voss, 1984; Little and Sweeting, 1984). 
The art, as most commentators have 
agreed, is to combine the two; or, to use 
a phrase adopted in two of the key studies 
in the field, to ensure the “proper 
coupling of R&D with marketing” 
(Mansfield, 1971; Freeman, 1982; see also 
Cooper, 1975; Aram and Javian, 1973; 
Souder, 1977, 1987; Rubinstein and others, 
1976). 
A second and largely separate line of 
research has focused on the barriers to 
innovation experienced in organizations, 
and especially in large corporations, and 
on the characteristics of those projects in 
organizations in which the barriers are 
successfully overcome. Here the emphasis 
has been on two factors, the importance 
of which has been well demonstrated and 
is now generally accepted. One is the 
existence of product champions operating 
at a senior enough level in the firm to 
effectively sponsor the innovation and 
overcome any natural organizational 
resistance to change (Schon, 1963; Roberts, 
1968; Chakrabarti, 1974; Maidique, 1980; 
Burgelman, 1983). The second is a general 
commitment of top management to 
innovation, embodied ‘n the practice of 
rewarding risk-takers and managing failure 
the accepted organizational 
goberts, 1968; Quinn and Mueller, %F 
Backus, 1984). 
On the basis of these consensus 
conclusions, a variety of recipes for the 
successful management of technological 
innovation have been put forward. 
Reflecting the research literature these 
are, broadly speaking, of two kinds. One 
kind, based primarily on the literature on 
R&D and marketing, focuses on the need 
for coordinating structures. In particular it 
advocates the use of matrix organizations 
for R&D or, carrying the same principle 
further, of a project-based organization 
for new product development in general, 
with all the main functional divisions of 
the organization represented in each 
project team. The other kind combines this 
prescription with a range of “cultural” 
imperatives drawn from the general 
observation of successful innovating firms 
and linked with the literature on 
champions and top management support. 
Most recent recipes have been of the 
latter kind, and although the details have 
varied from guru to guru they have shared 
a common core of main features. The need 
for active collaboration between the 
marketing and R&D functions remains 
central, even if it is sometimes obscured 
by the surrounding cultural rhetoric. And 
a project-based organization is the order 
of the day. But beyond this there is a call 
for competing project teams with multiple 
approaches, skunk works and developmental 
shoot-outs. Failure is to be managed as 
the norm, but membership of a successful 
product development team is to be made 
into the key employee goal. Champions are 
to be nurtured and made into corporate 
heroes. Top management should be visibly 
committed to the innovation process, which 
should be a key component of a strongly 
pronounced corporate image. And they 
should also have a strong market 
orientation, which should penetrate and 
act as the driving force for the whole 
organization (Peters and Waterman, 1982; 
Pascale and Athos, 1981; Quinn, 1985; 
Peters and Austin, 1985; Clifford and 
Cavanagh, 1985; Imae and others, 1984; 
Roberts, 1980). The aim, in the phrase 
coined by Quinn (1985), is “controlled 
chaos”: an environment in which all the 
advantages of small entrepreneurial firms 
are retained at the project level and 
corporate control is provided by the 
management of culture and by a pervasive 
awareness of and deference to the market 
place. 
These recipes appear to work well for the 
exemplary firms on whose practices they 
are largely based. They are clearly related 
to the research traditions mentioned 
above, and they also tie in well with the 
recent research results of Souder (1987, 
1988) correlating innovation success with 
the use of organizational commitment in 
place of formal controls, and with high 
levels of interaction and communication 
across traditional task boundaries. 
However, they leave unanswered two very 
basic problems. One is how to implement 
them. Knowing where to go is one thing, 
but getting there is quite another, and 
many firms clearly find the recipes almost 
impossible to enact. The other problem, 
underlying this practical one, is how the 
two sets of component prescriptions fit 
together: how the structural prescriptions 
for the coupling of R&D and marketing 
relate to the more general prescriptions on 
corporate culture. 
Barriers to imolementation 
The overriding problem is in implementing 
the required coordination between the 
marketing and R&D functions. Many firms 
would nowadays claim to be doing this 
effectively, and many now employ some 
kind of structural coordinating mechanism. 
But recent research results suggest 
strongly that such mechanisms are not 
working. There is still a chronic lack of 
understanding in industry as to how the 
marketing-R&D interface ought to operate. 
Even where there is a marketing inpur to 
initial project assessments, this is rarely 
carried through into the crucial 
engineering design phase. And where the 
marketing function is given a role in the 
development process it typically seeks to 
control that process, withholding its own 
information from engineers and designers, 
and rejecting any contributions they might 
seek to make outside its own imposed 
specifications or terms of reference (Gupta 
and others, 1985, 1988; Dumas, 1988; 
Bonnet, 1986). Either way, effective 
collaboration between marketing and R&D 
remains elusive. 
Underlying this lack of collaboration is a 
lack of understanding. Researchers -have 
long recognized that the marketing and 
R&D functions are typically characterized 
by strongly contrasting organizational 
subcultures, with different values, 
motivations and goals, differing status 
structures and reward systems, and 
different concepts of procedure and 
control (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
LaPorte, 1967). Given this context, it is 
scarcely surprising that members of the 
two functions find it very difficult to 
understand each other’s worlds. Recent 
research by Souder (1988) has shown that 
this is indeed the case, that, in particular, 
they find it difficult to understand and 
adapt to each other’s operational 
requirements, and that from this lack of 
understanding there arises a wide range of 
grievances and suspicions. 
It should not be surprising either, given 
what we know about the sources of 
conflict between departments and 
functional groups, that far from resolving 
these differences, organizational structures 
which bring the two subcultures into 
immediate contact tend also to bring them 
into open conflict (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967; Seiler, 1963; Walton and Dutton, 
1969; Souder, 1977, 1987). Classic sources 
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of interdepartmental conflict, such as 
task-related asymmetries and mutual 
dependencies, become more visible. And 
while any conflict may be overcome in 
some cases through the creation of a 
strong project identity and commitment, 
anything short of a very strong, and very 
elusive, degree of cohesion in this respect 
is likely to fatally compromise the 
organizational initiative. 
Besides this fundamental problem, other 
interfunctional relationships, such as those 
between marketing or R&D and operations 
can also cause problems well recognized in 
the research literature (Quinn and Mueller, 
1963; Burgelman, 1983) but scarcely 
addressed by the recipes for success. And 
the use of any project based organization 
in which the project teams have a high 
degree of autonomy faces other serious 
difficulties too. To advocate the 
management of failure is all very well, but 
innovative projects and internal new 
ventures do have very high failure rates 
(Roberts, 1980; Little and Sweeting, 1984). 
And research into executive attitudes to 
project teams and venture groups has 
shown that while executives recognize 
many advantages for such organizational 
structures their attitudes are dominated by 
persistent perceived disadvantages. They 
are worried about the difficulty of 
imposing financial control, and about 
excessive autonomy leading to 
developments that might fit into the 
company’s overall strategy. They 
anticipate difficulties in finding the right 
people to head up the teams. In short, 
they are quite reasonably worried about 
the danger of losing control, and strongly 
prefer to stick to a more traditional and 
tightly controlled organizational structure 
wherever possible (Hopkins, 1975). 
In summary it would appear that, while 
there is a large measure of consensus on 
the requirements to be met if a strategy 
of technological innovation is to be 
pursued successfully, there are formidable 
barriers to the implementation of these 
requirements. And there is relatively little 
guidance, within the recipes for success, 
as to how to overcome these. You cannot 
imitate 3M or Sony by imitating their 
organizational machinery. Matrix or project 
based structures are not universal 
panacaeas. The objective recognition of 
the need for project autonomy, loose 
financial controls, and operating flexibility 
sufficient to allow for skunk works, 
spontaneously arising high-performance 
teams and multiple competing approaches, 
is far from equivalent to a subjective 
preparedness to acccept the loss of 
immediate control entailed. And above all 
the call for an integration of marketing 
with research and development, or for a 
combination of a strongly marketing-led 
approach with technological freedom, is far 
removed from most firms’ realities of 
practice. Underlying all this is a 
pervasive uncertainty and vagueness about 
what roles the different parts of- the 
recipes play relative to each other, and 
what specific functions each part serves. 
The politics of innovation 
The key to this dilemma is to recognize 
that the innovation process is, like most 
organizational processes, a political one. 
Many writers in recent years have drawn 
attention to the political nature of 
organizations, and of the managerial 
processes within them (Farrell and 
Petersen, 1982; Gray and Ariss, 1985; 
Mintzberg, 1985, 1987; Mintzberg and 
McHugh, 1985; Kotter, 1986; Pfeffer, 1981; 
Narayonan and Fahey, 1982; Nielsen and 
Rao, 1987; Hambrick, 1981; Jemison, 1981, 
1984). In particular the political nature of 
decision making processes, both in general 
and in the context of technological 
innovation, has now been thoroughly 
attested to and explored through a 
substantial body of empirical research 
(Fahey, 1981; Hickson and others, 1986; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Pettigrew, 1973; 
Wilson, 1982; Welsh and Slusher, 1986; 
Johnson, 1987; Hendry, 1988; Graham, 
1986). The importance of political activity 
in the promotion or hindrance of change 
processes has also been thoroughly 
4 
demonstrated (Mumford and Pettigrew, 
1975; Pettigrew, 1985; Greiner, 1986; Guth 
and Macmillan, 1986). And a political 
perspective is implicit too in the literature 
on innovation champions and in that on 
interdepartmental conflict. The political 
nature of the processes concerned is not 
however recognized in the recipes for 
success, and it is here that the difficulties 
discussed above arise. 
From a political perspective, the problem 
of managing technological innovation is 
one of how to manage the collaboration 
betweeen rival interest groupss within the 
organization. Usually this will include 
interest groups with generally similar 
cultural backgrounds (and operating within 
the same functional divisions), but with 
different personal or social values or 
goals, different professional backgrounds, 
or competing political interests. Almost 
always it will include groups with 
contrasting cultural backgrounds, radically 
differing experiences, and different status 
and reward environments. If a set of 
prescriptions for solving the problem is to 
be successfully implemented, it must 
address this political reality, by taking full 
account of the political relationships 
between the parties involved. 
In those recipes which focus purely on the 
organizational structure, the aim, in 
political terms, is to provide a mechanism 
for the establishment of working 
relationships and consensus decision 
making across some of the principal 
political divisions of the organization. This 
prescription relies, however, on a sense of 
belonging and commitment to a project 
being sufficient to override the conflict 
automatically engendered by bringing the 
rival interest groups into close contact. 
And it also fails to address the political 
situation outside the project or venture 
group, and the barriers to change that are 
encountered there. 
One way of addressing these problems is 
to focus attention on methods for binding 
organizations together: for providing 
project teams with the cohesion to 
overcome their internal conflicts, and 
organizations as a whole the cohesion both 
to limit conflict on a larger scale and to 
provide an environment of trust in which 
project groups can be given sufficient 
autonomy to escape the effect of this 
wider conflict. And it would appear to be 
this approach that underlies the relative 
succes of the more recent culturally 
based recipes for managing innovation. A 
strong corporate image binds people 
together. So does a perceived commitment 
on behalf of top management to the 
innovation process. A preparedness to 
allow project teams to form spontaneously 
and the encouragement of competition 
between teams both serve to strengthen 
team bonding. Indeed the encouragement 
of conflict between groups (i.e. between 
project teams) is probably the fastest and 
most effective way of reducing conflict 
within them (i.e. between functions). And 
while it imposes its own problems, 
especially in terms of the management of 
failure, these are at least manageable. So 
long as the structure of political conflict 
separates vital elements of expertise, such 
as those held by the research and 
marketing specialists, nothing is 
manageable for there is nothing to manage. 
These binding effects are important. But 
they are also limited. A strongly 
proclaimed set of corporate cultural norms 
informs people what is expected of them, 
and provides a foundation for bonding in 
terms of shared perceptions. But it can 
only act as an effective unifier if it is 
specific enough to direct people’s 
behaviour, and that brings us back to our 
original problems. Unless there are some 
other means of coordinating research and 
marketing, for example, proclaimed cultural 
norms must almost inevitably favour one 
or the other, or be irrelevant to the 
innovation process. Within the framework 
of the existing prescriptions a corporate 
commitment to innovation per se can only 
work in conjunction with the use of 
autnonomous and competing project teams, 
and these raise the issues of control we 
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discussed earlier. Any organization needs 
some form of control over its activities, 
and if this is not to be operated through a 
tight corporate structure there must be 
some overriding discipline, be it financially 
or more broadly marketing based, which 
will again upset the balance of the 
innovation process. Or else an organization 
must be prepared to take genuine risks. Of 
the exemplary companies used as the basis 
for existing prescriptions, many are 
actually market-led, and while this 
approach is reaping short-term harvests, 
its long-term viability remains open to 
question (Quinn and McGrath, 1985). 
Others are actually risk-takers, but while 
it may be necessary to take risks in order 
to optimize the chances of survival this is 
an approach that is unlikely to be widely 
imitated, at least so long as there plDpear 
to be more comfortable options. 
Overcoming the barriers 
So far as they relate to the politics of the 
situation at all the existing recipes for 
innovation success rely almost entirely on 
the provision of forms of corporate glue. 
But this is like taking a set of magnets 
and, instead of aligning them, trying to 
glue them together by their repelling 
poles. If the glue is strong enough they 
may hold together for a time, but the 
forces of repulsion will be undiminished. 
The arrangement will be unstable and 
instead of being put to useful work the 
magnetic energy will be wasted. Similarly 
with organizations, one can glue together 
rival interest groups so as to neutralise 
their conflicts, but it may be only at the 
expense of neutralising their powers too. 
The glue can play a very important part, 
but the first priority should be to remove, 
so far as possible, the sources of conflict. 
Surprisingly, despite the considerable 
research into the sources of conflict, 
relatively little has been written about 
their removal. In the course of some 
recent research on the management of new 
product innovations, Souder (1988) has 
however made some sugestions as to how 
this might be achieved within an 
organizational development setting, giving 
some evidence in support of a procedure 
which involves alternating periods of 
nominal (side by side) and interacting 
(face to face) group activities. And once 
we ask the right question, our knowledge 
of the practices of successful innovating 
firms produces some ready answers. In 
particular, many of the practices of 
Japanese technology-based firms appear to 
relate directly to our problem, without 
being in any way specific to a Japanese 
context (Ohmae, 1985; Imae and others, 
1984; Pascale and Athos, 1981; Rubinger, 
1985). Drawing on these practices, all of 
which are mentioned, though not generally 
emphasized, in the existing literature, as 
well as on our own research into the 
management of technology and design and 
the work of Souder and others on inter- 
departmental conflict, we may put together 
a list of eight ways in which conflict 
might be reduced, and the barriers to 
innovation lessened. 
1. Group development programmes such 
as that proposed by Souder, in which 
the timing and extent of integration 
and retreat can be managed by 
development experts, have an obvious 
part to-play. 
2. 
3. 
Common socialization processes, and 
in particular common training 
programmes for marketing and R&D 
recruits, should serve both to 
strengthen the glue of an overriding 
corporate culture and to reduce 
conflict through the provision of 
shared experience. 
The recruitment of science and 
engineering graduates to the 
marketing function, either directly or 
through a period in the R&D 
function, should help to overcome one 
of the major communication barriers 
between the two functions, and with 
it a large element of mistrust and 
suspicion. 
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4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Job rotation programmes or similar 
schemes, if sufficiently widespread, 
should further strengthen 
interdepartmental understanding, 
both through shared experiences and 
through the building of personal 
linkages. 
Strong social and recreational 
programmes have a part to play not 
only in enhancing corporate 
belonging but also in encouraging 
personal cross-functional links. 
Common status and reward systems 
should also remove a major source 
of conflict. For an organization 
starting with a mixture of systems 
(by research ability, management 
ability, seniority, market shortage, 
etc), this will inevitably entail costs 
as some groups are paid over the 
previous “going rate”, and may also 
entail some staff losses. But the 
costs should be mitigated by 
improvements in quality and should 
be substantially outweighed by the 
benefits. Moreover, since reward 
systems provide one of the most 
visible demonstrations of the values 
of the organization the careful 
management of relative rewards 
should anyway be a top 
organizational priority. 
Of crucial importance, but rarely 
discussed, is the role played by the 
design function. In some firms the 
presence of a design department 
serves merely to complicate the 
political situation, while in others it 
is virtually an irrelevance, ignored 
so far as possible by both marketing 
and R&D (Hendry and Dumas, 1988). 
But given the appropriate authority 
it can play an important 
coordinating role, and indeed must 
do so if the product design process 
is to be successful. An autonomous 
design department, independent of 
the marketing function and with 
sufficient internal authority not to 
‘b 
be ignored by that functihcan 
serve both to improve %!n&-,.* 
product design and to speed up 
and facilitate the collaborative 
new product development 
process. This is also an area in 
which external consultants can 
be used to good effect, their 
freedom from the organizational 
structure allowing them to 
create communication channels 
and bonds between the different 
functions. 
8. More ambitiously, but not necessarily 
impracticably so, a range of specific 
training and organizational 
development programmes might be 
used to change the very nature of 
the functions themselves, and 
particularly of the marketing 
function. 
There is nothing radically new in these 
suggestions. All are already implemented 
to some extent in some firms, in the West 
as well as in Japan. The Japanese 
education system does simplify the 
recruitment of scientifically trained 
marketing and operations staff and the use 
of the R&D function as a staff resource 
pool on which other functions can draw. 
But there is nothing in principle to 
prevent Western corporations from 
adopting similar policies. 
What all this points to is a form of 
organization that is marketing centred, but 
is nevertheless technologically literate, and 
more specifically design-literate, through 
and through. Picking up on point (8) 
above, this suggests a new role for the 
marketing function. In a recent paper, . 
Miles and Snow (1986) claim to identify 
the emergence of a new form of 
organizational structure designed to cope 
with the increasingly competitive and 
rapidly changing markets and technologies 
characteristic of the present era. These 
“dynamic networks” are characterised by 
vertical disaggregation, with market 
mechanisms and full information disclosure 
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systems taking the place of the close 
linkages and trust characteristic of more 
traditional organizational forms: a move 
from heirarchies to internal markets. The 
key figures in these structures are 
“brokers”, dealing as in a market place 
with the four separate constituencies of 
suppliers, producers, designers and 
distributors. 
avenues of recruitment for marketing 
personnel. If the function is to exercise 
properly the powers it is being afforded in 
contemporary organizations, however, such 
changes may well be necessary. 
How representative, and indeed how 
desirable, this model is is open to 
question, but it does provide a provocative 
extreme representation of an organization 
in which interfunctional linkages and trust 
cannot be relied upon, as is often the case 
in the technology-based firm. And it 
prompts the question: who are the 
brokers? They can only be the marketing 
function, and if that function is to play 
the central role in a disaggregated 
organization, it should perhaps do so also 
in the more closely knit firm to which we 
are aspiring here. Several writers have 
recently argued strongly for an internal as 
well as an external role for the marketing 
function (Leonard-Barton and Kraus, 1985; 
Simmonds, 1986), and such a role would 
provide a natural organizational setting for 
that most crucial of ingredients for 
innovation success, the product champion. 
It would seem in many respects to be 
precisely what is needed for the 
management of innovation. 
As we have already noted, there are many 
advocates of a marketing-led approach to 
innovation, but these generally assume a 
traditional externally-oriented marketing 
function using its knowledge of the 
external market to specify development 
targets. An internal marketing role 
implies a knowledge of the interior of the 
organization, including the R&D and 
operating functions, equal to that of the 
external environment. It implies, in 
particular, a detailed knowledge of the 
technological capabilities, preferences and 
trajectories existing in the organization, as 
well as of their cultural settings and 
political structuring. This in turn would 
require radically new forms of training and 
8 
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